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Judicialization or Renunciation?
Judges in Today's Landscape of
Anti- Terrorism Laws
By Grant R. Hoole* and Rebecca Ananian-Welsh**
Judges in constitutional democracies face com-
mon dilemmas navigating today's landscape of
anti-terrorism laws. Whether it is with respect
to the oversight of investigative detentions or
approval of control orders, security certificates,
and other official powers calculated to investi-
gate and prevent terrorism and related activities,
the judicial role has expanded into fields where
the appropriate balancing of security concerns
with individual liberties is exceedingly complex.
The need for such balancing is, of course, one of
the central justifications for judicial involvement:
the judiciary is relied upon to bring characteris-
tic independence and integrity to the review of
official powers, ensuring compliance between
the latter and the higher law of the Constitution.
There is nevertheless an unsettling implication
that sometimes attends judicial service in these
fields - namely, it is not always clear whether
the judicial role is truly one of constitutional
enforcement and oversight, or one that allows
administrative actors to borrow the integrity of
the courts in furtherance of constitutionally-sus-
pect ends.'
This concern is brought into sharp relief by
powers legislatively conferred on officials of Aus-
tralia's Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)
since 9/11, and new ones intended for officials
of Canada's Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
in Bill C-51,2 the most recent iteration of Cana-
da's anti-terrorism laws. Both of these legislative
regimes engage judges in ostensible oversight
roles, but also raise troubling implications for
their independence and for public confidence in
the judiciary. The Constitutions of each country
present distinct obstacles and potential solutions
to this challenge. A comparison of their respec-
tive positions helps illuminate possible ways for-
ward for each.
Australia and Canada share constitutional
origins as the descendants of British colonial
states, yet their Constitutions are marked by
significant differences. While both countries
are Westminster-style parliamentary democra-
cies observing a relatively weak separation of
powers between the executive and legislative
branches of government, Australia enforces a
strict separation between the judiciary and the
political branches. The High Court observed
in its landmark 1956 decision in R v Kirby; Ex
parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia3 : "A fed-
eral constitution must be rigid. The government
it establishes must be one of defined powers;
within those powers it must be paramount, but
it must be incompetent to go beyond them"4 By
virtue of Australia's federal judiciary being vested
with distinct powers under Chapter III of the
Commonwealth Constitution, the courts have
inferred that federal judicial powers are both
exclusive and exhaustive: no authorities other
than federal courts may exercise those powers,
and federal courts themselves may not exercise
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powers that are not formally "judicial' This
principle results in federal courts being barred
from functions sometimes exercised by the judi-
ciaries of other countries, such as the provision
of advisory reference decisions to Parliament, or
the issuance of warrants for surveillance activi-
ties by the police. In each case, departure from
the traditional adjudicative determination of
claims raised by litigants is thought to compro-
mise the judicial purview under the separation
of powers. 6
The use of Australian judges in anti-terror-
ism legislative schemes is facilitated by an excep-
tion to this principle. A longstanding caveat to
the strict separation of judicial power is that
judges acting in a personal capacity, as personae
designata, may assume official duties that vest in
them as persons rather than as judges.7 Modern
case law has qualified this exception by requir-
ing that such extra-judicial service cohere with
the judicial role under the Constitution, as deter-
mined by a doctrinal test of compatibility.8 The
latter test requires, first, that a judge not assume
so "permanent and complete" an extra-judicial
function that his or her judicial duties are dis-
rupted.9 The judge's ability to continue perform-
ing judicial duties with the requisite integrity
must not be impaired, and the extra-judicial
function must not be "of such a nature that pub-
lic confidence in the integrity and impartiality in
the judiciary [as a whole] . . . is diminished.""
Public confidence, in turn, will be found to have
been vitiated should the extra-judicial function
involve "too close a connection" between the
appointee and the executive branch, should the
function be subject to direction or advice from
the political branches, or should any discre-
tion exercised by the persona designata judge be
based on grounds other than those prescribed by
law." This doctrine has recently been extended
to govern the extra-judicial activity of Australia's
state and territorial judiciary. 2
Consequently, when Australian judges are
statutorily assigned new oversight functions
related to the activities of security and intelli-
gence officials, they assume these functions in
an administrative capacity as individuals, not as
judges. From a constitutional perspective, their
powers must not conflict with the independence
and integrity of the judiciary; but the powers
nevertheless vest in them personally, not in the
courts to which they belong.
Unlike their Australian counterparts, the
unique jurisdiction of Canada's judiciary receives
no express endorsement in textual provisions of
the country's constitutional documents. Rather,
Canada observes a functional separation of pow-
ers derived variously from the judicature pro-
visions of the Constitution Act, 1867,3 which
secure federal jurisdiction for the appointment
of courts of inherent jurisdiction; 4 the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms," which requires, inter alia,
that individuals charged with criminal offences
be afforded independent and impartial judicial
hearings;16 and from a broad, implied principle
of judicial independence anchored in the pre-
amble to the Constitution Act, 1867, which the
Supreme Court has interpreted, controversially, 7
to "fill out gaps"'8 in constitutional text and to
provide robust institutional and administrative
safeguards for the judiciary.9 The terminology of
"persona designata appointments" is largely alien
to contemporary Canadian judicial practice.
In 1985, the Supreme Court held in Minister of
Indian Affairs v Ranville2 ° that all statutory con-
ferrals of authority on Canadian superior courts
should be assumed to vest in them as courts, not
in the judges as individuals, barring express leg-
islative intention to the contrary.21
With the exception of judicial service in
commissions of inquiry, on certain adminis-
trative tribunals, and in a small number of cer-
emonial administrative functions,22 Canadian
judges thus assume new statutory powers and
responsibilities qua judges. Importantly, they
are also empowered with a constitutional instru-
ment denied their Australian counterparts: an
entrenched Charter of Rights, affording judges
a basis to annul, sever, or read corrections into
constitutionally-defective regimes successfully
challenged by Charter litigants. The notion of
judicial independence as it has been expressed
in post-Charter Canadian jurisprudence is inti-
mately tied to the role of judges as guardians of
individual rights, since the judicial duty to safe-
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guard the Constitution embraces the rights-pro-
tections therein.23
These differences have intriguing implica-
tions for the involvement of Australian and
Canadian judges in anti-terrorism regimes. Aus-
tralia's approach produces a paradoxical situation
in which departure from judicial norms (and
the high standards of fairness that attend them)
may reinforce the constitutional validity of new
oversight functions. The doctrine of incompat-
ibility requires that extra-judicial appointments
be voluntary,24 that they involve observance of
the basic elements of procedural fairness,2 and
that they not involve decision-making on politi-
cal grounds 6.2 Yet, the extra-judicial appointee
is barred from behaving too judicially, lest he or
she convert the proceeding into an actual judicial
hearing, thus tramping on the principle that only
courts may exercise judicial power.27 Australian
judges thus have limited scope to leverage their
authority in extra-judicial proceedings to require
standards of due process approximating those of
courts.
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Aus-
tralia amended the Australian Security Intel-
ligence Organisation Act 197928 to allow ASIO
officers to seek investigative warrants authoriz-
ing the interrogation of individuals (including
children aged 16-17 years) for up to 24 hours,29
and detention warrants authorizing detention of
an individual for up to 7 days for the purposes
of interrogation. 0 Individuals subject to such
warrants have no right to silence, no privilege
against self-incrimination, and may be subjected
to bodily and strip-searches. 3' Their right to
contact third parties, including legal representa-
tives, is severely curtailed.32 Disclosure and non-
compliance offences attaching to the regime are
punishable by imprisonment.33 Serving federal,
state, and territory judges play key roles in the
warrant schemes. The warrants are issued by fed-
eral judges acting as personae designata.34 Once
a warrant has been issued, the subject is imme-
diately brought before a "prescribed authority"
who oversees all exercises of power under the
warrant. 3' The prescribed authority may be a
serving judge of a state or territory court acting
persona designata.36
The troubling civil liberty implications of
this regime have been aptly stated by Sir Gerard
Brennan, former Chief Justice of the High Court:
"a person may be detained in custody, virtually
incommunicado without even being accused
of involvement in terrorist activity, on grounds
which are kept secret and without effective
opportunity to challenge the basis of his or her
detention. '37 The outcome of a likely constitu-
tional challenge under Chapter III is unclear,
however. On the one hand, the regime presents a
clear optic that the prescribed authority is acting
in aid of the executive in facilitating an investiga-
tion. Interrogations under either an investigative
or detention warrant occur in private. The judge
acting persona designata is reliant on agents of the
executive for the disclosure of information justi-
fying issuance of the warrant, and cannot compel
the production of evidence (either to herself or
to the affected individual) during the interro-
gations. This informational imbalance - a sig-
nificant departure from the traditional openness
and adversarial rigour of a court - casts doubt
on the judge's ability to ensure fairness and to act
with true independence. The judge nevertheless
exercises discretion independently in the sense
that she remains master of the decision to grant
a warrant, and may procedurally direct the inter-
rogations by ordering an end to questioning or
by requiring that the individual be represented
by counsel, among other measures.
38
Counter-intuitively, the case law may imply
that the very features of the regime which are
concerning - its secrecy and lack of adversarial
testing of evidence - are the source of its con-
stitutional validity. Most recently, in Wainohu v
New South Wales,39 the High Court invalidated a
legislative scheme implicating state court judges
in issuing control orders. The provisions com-
promised fair process by, for instance, involving
secret evidence not governed by traditional rules.
But, the powers were also exercised in proceed-
ings with the appearance of open court, at which
the applicant and respondent had an opportunity
to put a case and test that of the other side. This,
combined with the absence of a duty for the pre-
siding judge to give reasons, proved constitution-
ally fatal: the appearance of open-court coupled
with removal of the obligation to give reasons
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impermissibly undermined public confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary.4 Notably, past
Chapter III jurisprudence has affirmed the valid-
ity of in camera, ex parte proceedings in which
personae designata judges are similarly unen-
cumbered by a duty to give reasons. 4' A possible
inference is that proceedings which observe less
transparency to begin with, and less characteris-
tic features of judicial probity and fairness, may
be more likely to survive a Chapter III challenge
because they do not invite analogies to the tradi-
tional judicial role.
This presents a striking contrast to the situa-
tion in Canada. Here, the interrelation of Charter
rights with a broad independence principle has
enabled courts to effectively "judicialize" coun-
ter-terrorism proceedings. This was evident in
Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigra-
tion),42 where the Supreme Court invalidated a
security certificate regime that denied judges the
ability to adequately test the secret evidentiary
claims of government officials, either through
independent inquisitorial powers or through the
adversarial claims of affected individuals. 43 The
resulting amendments to the regime, the con-
stitutionality of which was recently affirmed in
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Har-
kat,44 brought it closer to an adversarial, adjudi-
cative model by allowing for the appointment of
special advocates to challenge secret evidence.
In finding the amended regime compliant with
section 7 of the Charter, the Court interpreted
the new provisions in a manner that reinforced
the judicial character of the proceedings. For
example, the Court emphasized the role of des-
ignated judges as "gatekeepers", ensuring fairness
to the individual subjects of security certificates
and guarding vigilantly against government
over-claiming of secrecy.4 Special advocates are
to serve as "substantial substitutes" for participa-
tion in closed hearings by the affected individu-
als themselves. 46 Moreover, the Court opined that
special advocates should receive liberal authori-
zation to communicate with affected individuals,
the onus being on government to prove the neces-
sity of restrictions on communication.47 Finally,
designated judges are to ensure an "incompress-
ible minimum" disclosure of information to the
subjects of security certificates, enabling them
to know the case to be met.48 Where the regime
works an unfairness, designated judges retain the
authority to issue remedies under section 24(1)
of the Charter, including a stay of proceedings.49
In 2004, the Supreme Court upheld a regime
of judicial investigative hearings which, in its
purpose, largely parallels Australia's system of
investigation and detention warrants.50 Crucially,
the Court only did so after inferring the neces-
sity of individual protections that rendered the
regime compliant with the Charter and with the
principle of judicial independence. Thus, while
Canadian Superior Court judges may be enlisted
to oversee coercive investigative hearings con-
ducted by crown attorneys in furtherance of
counter-terrorism measures, the individual
subjects of such hearings benefit from proce-
dural rights appropriate to a judicial forum. For
example, judges will apply demanding criminal
law standards of relevance to allow or disallow
certain lines of questioning.5 ' Supplementing a
statutory right for subjects to be represented by
counsel, the Court specified that counsel must be
afforded a "fulsome" opportunity to participate
in the hearings, not limited to narrow grounds of
objection.12 Despite the relatively narrow deriva-
tive-use immunity stipulated by the statute, the
Court found that testimony given by subjects
may not be admitted in any subsequent proceed-
ings engaging their personal security, including
extradition and deportation hearings." Perhaps
most importantly, the Court held that the judi-
cial status of the proceedings required presump-
tive application of the open-court principle: the
hearings were to take place in public view, with
the onus resting on the crown to demonstrate the
necessity of publication bans or in camera hear-
ings on a case-by-case basis, applying the stan-
dards applicable to all judicial hearings, includ-
ing trials.5 4 It should be acknowledged that LeBel
and Fish JJ both dissented from these findings.55
They disagreed with the majority position that
judges have the requisite tools to enforce indi-
vidual rights in the investigative hearings, and
found the regime to compromise the institu-
tional independence of the judiciary by generat-
ing a public perception of judges acting in aid of
investigations carried out by the executive. 6
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While Australian judges cannot employ
entrenched constitutional rights to enhance the
fairness of legislative counter-terrorism schemes,
they may still draw a valuable lesson from the
Canadian courts' unselfconscious abilityto absorb
new powers qua courts, and thus exercise those
powers in a way that is explicitly judicial. Spe-
cifically, the Australian judiciary might evoke the
incompatibility doctrine to achieve similar judi-
cializing effects as Canada's Charter, by treating
core features of judicial procedure as fundamen-
tal to the independence of judges personae desig-
nata and to public confidence in the judiciary as
a whole. This would be tantamount to declaring
that where persona designata functions involve
the oversight of coercive measures against indi-
viduals, court-like standards of due process are
necessary to ensure constitutional validity. Such
a declaration comes with the danger that the per-
sona designata judge could be viewed as actually
acting judicially, and thus in violation of Chap-
ter III by having appropriated an administrative
power to his or her court. The conferred power
would be thereby annulled. Yet, this may be an
unavoidable and necessary outcome: where the
limits of judicialization are reached, judges may
be forced to resort to principled renunciation in
order to avoid conferring judicial legitimacy on
processes whose curtailment of individual liberty
is disproportionate to their stated security goals.
In effect, the judges would be stating that such
powers must be truly exercised judicially, or not
exercised by judges at all.
Canadian judges may also take a lesson from
their Australian counterparts. While the Charter
empowers courts to render new judicial func-
tions compliant with high procedural rights, the
Canadian courts lack an analytic device compa-
rable to the incompatibility doctrine to identify
instances in which the acceptance of new powers
(whether by individual judges or, in most cases,
by the courts themselves) should be barred out-
right. Indeed, under the Canadian model, new
statutory powers conferred on courts vest in
them automatically and are exercised pursuant
to the legislation's stated terms pending constitu-
tional challenge. In Charkoui, the Supreme Court
observed that judges under the original security
certificate regime worked "assiduously" to over-
come its defects.5 7 Of course, these efforts were
inadequate to render the regime constitutionally
compliant: hard work and principled motiva-
tion by the administrators of unconstitutional
legislative powers won't save the legislation. Bar-
ring preemptive recognition and correction of
its defects by Parliament, such legislation will
await constitutional challenge. The fact that most
new statutory powers vest in Australian judges
personae designata, and that their assumption
must be voluntary, means that those judges bear
an ethical onus to scrutinize the constitutional
propriety of an appointment before undertak-
ing it. While in reality this duty may not always
be exercised rigorously (otherwise there would
be little need for subsequent constitutional chal-
lenges under Chapter III), it still presents an
important threshold power which is absent in
the Canadian context. That absence is troubling
when one considers the odious effects that may
be rendered by a regime - both upon individu-
als and upon confidence in the judiciary - while
it awaits constitutional challenge.
This danger is acutely represented by Bill
C-51. 8 Among other concerning provisions,
which have been extensively studied elsewhere, 9
the Bill will empower CSIS officials to undertake
undefined "measures" both within and outside
Canada, to counteract threats to national secu-
rity.6" When authorized by a warrant issued in
private by a judge of the Federal Court, these
measures may contravene Canadian law, includ-
ing the Charter.6 Although the authorities seek-
ing such a warrant must demonstrate its "rea-
sonableness and proportionality "62 and the Bill
prohibits actions that inflict bodily harm, pervert
the course of justice, or violate a person's sex-
ual integrity,63 the purported empowerment of
judges to preemptively authorize contravention
of the law, let alone the country's highest law, is
startling and unprecedented. As Professor Craig
Forcese has observed: "What the government
proposes now is a 'constitutional breach warrant'
It is a radical idea that contorts basic constitu-
tional understandings and the role of the courts.
It has been correctly compared to a stealth use of
the notwithstanding clause, in which judges and
not Parliament are being asked to do the dirty
work of abrogating rights."64
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When courts apply proportionality analysis
under section 1 of the Charter to test the validity
of legislation impinging on rights, they are exer-
cising a designated role under the separation of
powers to act as the final arbiter of legal rights,
involving scrutiny of actual, enacted law. This is
very different from judges secretly weighing the
proportionality of measures proposed by execu-
tive actors, pronouncing on a preemptive basis
whether they justify Charter "contravention"'6
Such a function blurs the distinction between
executive and judicial decision-making: it effec-
tively places the judge in the shoes of an execu-
tive administrator, ascertaining whether a given
circumstance warrants the displacement of legal
norms for the exigencies of national security. It
cannot truly be said that in doing so the courts
are interpreting or applying law: applying a "law
to authorize breaking the law" is a contradiction
in terms. Its constitutionality is suspect on its
face.
Yet this, in itself, is no bar to judges of the
Federal Court acting under the legislation,
should it become law, up until the point that it
is successfully challenged by constitutional liti-
gants. Moreover, even should those judges work
in good faith to restrain arbitrary or excessive
use of the power - as they did in applying the
original, invalid legislation governing security
certificates - this is no guarantee that affected
individuals won't suffer constitutionally-invalid
effects. This is especially the case when the very
type of discretion judges are being asked to exer-
cise appears to be at odds with the Charter, the
separation of powers, and the principle of judi-
cial independence itself. In the interim, public
confidence in the judiciary may be eroded by the
Federal Court's submission to legislative abro-
gation of the judicial role in safeguarding these
values.
One clear solution, albeit a radical one, is
highlighted by the Australian doctrine of incom-
patibility: the Federal Court, as an independent
and administratively-distinct entity, could refuse
to exercise the warrant issuing power altogether,
treating it as a basic assault on its constitu-
tional independence. The preemptive exercise
of a Canadian court's authority over its internal
administration has never, to our knowledge, been
used to save judges from the exercise of inher-
ently odious powers. But then, the courts have
never been asked to sanction a breach of con-
stitutional law in the manner envisaged by Bill
C-51. The extreme nature of the legislation may
warrant an extreme and unprecedented judicial
measure in response.
A comparison of Australian and Canadian
judicial involvement in legislative counter-ter-
rorism regimes leads us to conclude that judges
in both countries face a dilemma best framed as
one between judicialization and renunciation.
Public confidence in judicial integrity derives
not from a vague faith in the personal qualities
of judges to do the right thing in the face of sus-
pect powers, but from the institutional features
of judicial decision-making that reinforce inde-
pendence and impartiality: openness, fair pro-
cess, high evidentiary standards, and fidelity to
the Constitution, to name a few. If public con-
fidence in the judiciary is the purported basis
for judicial service in new oversight roles, then
the institutional values which sustain it should
follow judges to those settings. Conversely, set-
tings in which legislators have chosen to abro-
gate those values are ill-suited to judicial service.
Legislators have a prerogative to govern in the
public interest, but forays into secrecy, coercive
power, and suspended liberties are ones where
judges shouldn't follow them.
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the scope of infringement is not disproportionate
to that objective. Rights are violated when
infringements cannot be justified in these terms,
resulting in the annulment of the impugned
legislation. By not using the term "infringe,' the
drafters of Bill C-51 appear to seek conferral of a
power exceeding that characteristic of legislation
whose Charter-adverse qualities can be justified
under s 1. They have nevertheless avoided adopting
the very term - "violation" - that is eponymous
with unconstitutionality in Charter jurisprudence.
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